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X I . D I STI N G U I S H E D  PAN E l: S U PR E M E  
C O U RT P H I LO S O PHY O N  LA B O R  
A N D E M P LOYM E NT I S S U ES 
S u pre me Co u rt P h i � osop hy o n  
La bor a nd E m p i oym e nt issu es 
THEODORE J.  ST. ANTOINE 
University of Michigan 
It would not take a confirmed cynic to suggest that the title of this 
paper amounts to an oxymoron. That soft-hearted but tough-minded 
commentator, Florian Bartosic, and his collaborator, Gary Minda, 
came close to putting it in so many words: " [T]he Supreme Court lacks 
a consistent and coherent theory of labor law" (1982) . My own view is 
somewhat different. First, lack of a consistent judicial philosophy is 
not all bad; at least it is better than a consistently wrong philosophy. 
Second, the vacillating theories of the Supreme Court tend to reflect 
the divergent attitudes of American society toward labor over the 
years. These are expressed, for example, in the variegated writings of 
such scholars as Atleson ( 1983), Bok and Dunlop ( 1970) , Cox (1960),  
Northrup ( 1964), Tomlins ( 1985), and Wellington (1968), as well as in 
the quite dissimilar policy pronouncements of Congress in the Wagner 
(1935) and Taft-Hartley (1947) Acts. Finally, and here I most nearly 
agree with Bartosic and Minda, the Supreme Court has at times 
exhibited a profound misconception of the values of organized labor 
and the lives of ordinary working people, minorities and women in 
particular. But in fairness, those instances must be balanced against 
others in which the Court has displayed an almost startling insight into 
the realities of industrial relationships. 
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It is not enough for our highest appellate tribunal to reach even 
right results in individual cases. Principled decision making is essential 
for the guidance of the lower courts and the administrative agencies. 
Sometimes that will mean overriding collective or union values, but at 
least those values deserve to be understood. My aim in this paper is to 
examine several illustrative decisions to demonstrate what I believe is 
a distressing confusion about basic principles and values. I shall first 
look at cases dealing with union-management relations and then at 
those dealing with employment discrimination and affirmative action. 
Union-Management Relations 
Strikes, Picketing, and Boycotts 
Three years ago, in TWA v. Flight Attendants ( 1989), the Supreme 
Court ruled that at the end of an economic strike, an employer could 
retain employees who worked during the strike and not replace them 
with striking employees who had greater seniority, just as it could hire 
new "permanent replacements" from outside. In so holding the Court 
placed American labor law at odds with the law or practice of Western 
Europe and with the International Labor Organization's latest 
interpretation of its guarantee of Freedom of Association (1991 ) .  Yet 
the TWA decision is but a modest and not illogical extension of the 50-
year-old precedent of Mackay Radio ( 1938), which first established an 
employer's right of permanent replacement. Mackay and TWA can be 
seen as trampling over incumbent employees' hard-earned equity in 
their jobs, and as dismissing union people's long-standing, deep-seated 
aversion to strikebreakers, or "scabs." But what could be more in the 
American grain than the individualistic belief that the employer is 
entitled to enlist anyone's aid-and promise permanent employment 
as an inducement-to keep its operations running? In thus elevating 
individual over collective values, the Court was arguably right in tune 
with the mind set of the 1980s. 
To ask someone to make a lawful, independent, and totally 
uncoerced decision not to patronize a particular business would 
appear unexceptionable, and constitutionally protected as well. But if 
that self-same message, the better to be seen, is placed on a large sign 
and carried around, as is the working person's wont, it is no longer an 
appeal to "reason" but instead a "signal" calling for an "automatic 
response" and hence subject to prohibition. So declared the best 
reasoned of several opinions supporting the majority position in 
Safeco (1980) .  The holding was that a union violated the secondary 
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boycott provisions of Taft-Hartley by picketing to urge consumers not 
to buy a particular primary product that constituted the major sales 
item of a neutral distributor. The badly flawed opinion of the Court 
did no more to meet First Amendment objections than to cite earlier 
decisions dealing with picketing addressed to union members. Wholly 
ignored was the important distinction between an appeal to a group, 
acting in accordance with group loyalties and even group discipline, 
and an appeal to individual members of the consuming public, acting 
in accordance with their own individual lights. 
As if to underscore its downgrading of picketing as a means of 
communication, the Supreme Court was prepared in DeBartolo II 
(1988) to engage in some strained statutory construction in order to 
avoid constitutional questions and sustain the legality of handbilling 
asking customers not to shop at any of the stores in a mall where a 
nonunion builder was operating. Apparently picketing, organized 
labor's traditional mode of appeal and protest, falls into an entirely 
different category from handbilling and other methods of communi­
cating. Regardless of its peacefulness, its location, or the lawfulness of 
its message if conveyed by another means, picketing may be treated as 
coercive per se and lose the First Amendment protections afforded 
other forms of speech. 
Just when one is beginning to wonder whether the Court disdains 
the values most prized by the labor movement, along comes a line of 
decisions that looks very much in the opposite direction. In the 
National Woodwork ( 1967) and Longshoremen ( 1985) cases, the Court 
overrode the literal boycott language of Taft-Hartley and upheld work 
preservation clauses even though they seriously impaired technologi­
cal innovation and productive efficiency in the construction and 
maritime industries. At the forefront of the Court's analysis was the 
primacy accorded free, voluntary collective bargaining, which has 
long occupied an honored place in the Court's pantheon. Perhaps it is 
that "free, voluntary" aspect of union-management negotiations which 
makes collective bargaining so attractive to a number of Justices. As 
we shall see next, however, even this relatively favored institution has 
its definite limitations. 
Collective Bargaining 
Over the past three decades, the most controversial issue regarding 
the scope of the duty to bargain has been the extent to which 
employers must negotiate about managerial decisions that result in a 
shrinkage of employee job opportunities. Under the Kennedy Labor 
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Board a wide range of managerial decisions were reclassified as 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Warren Court's Fibreboard 
decision ( 1964) , dealing with the in-plant subcontracting o f  
maintenance work, gave qualified approval to  this development. But 
the Burger Court took a different tack in First National Maintenance 
( 1981 ) .  Although the peculiar facts of FNM could narrow the 
significance of its holding, the case was described by the Court as 
involving "an economically motivated decision to shut down part of a 
business." The Court held, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall 
dissenting, that the employer did not have to negotiate with the union 
about that determination. 
In FNM the Court first declared that a proposed subject must be 
"amenable to resolution" through collective bargaining. Then came a 
balancing test. Bargaining over a managerial decision would be 
required only if the "benefit, for labor-management relations . . . 
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business." As the 
dissenters rightly objected, this supposed balancing tilted the scales 
against legitimate employee interests. It also ignored the increasing 
body of empirical data that union and employee input may greatly 
enhance the quality of management decision making. FNM was 
plainly a retrogressive movement in the Supreme Court's labor 
philosophy. 
If FNM was a backward step, Connell (1975) was a headlong 
retreat. The Supreme Court held that a union lost its federal antitrust 
immunity when it sought and obtained an agreement from a general 
contractor that the latter would subcontract mechanical work only to 
firms that had a current contract with the union. For my purposes, the 
most significant aspect of the Court's decision was its characterization 
of the union's action as an attempted exclusion of potential business 
competitors from the subcontracting field, a matter of product market 
and antitrust concern. Surely most industrial relations experts would 
see the union's action as an effort to organize nonunion firms, a matter 
of labor market and labor law concern. Fortunately, in the subsequent 
Woelke & Romero case ( 1982) , the Court limited Connell and held 
that a union was entitled to get a union-only subcontracting clause as 
long as it had a regular collective bargaining relationship with the 
employer. Connell remains important, however, in showing how 
critical rna y be the lens through which the Justices view a problem: is 
it a labor issue, or something else? 
One aspect of collective bargaining has always been held in high 
esteem by the Supreme Court, namely, the provision for final and 
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binding arbitration of disputes between unions and employers. In part 
the explanation may be that arbitration implements one of the Courfs 
most fervently espoused values, industrial peace. In part the 
explanation may be that arbitration saves the federal judiciary from 
what could be the crushing burden of adjudicating claims under more 
than 100,000 collective bargaining agreements across the country. At 
any rate, the Court in the Misco case (1987) did not even stop short of 
enforcing an arbitral award reinstating a discharged employee, despite 
the employer's contention that the award violated public policy by 
putting back on a dangerous paper-cutting machine a worker who had 
been fired for smoking marijuana. 
Race and Sex Discrimination 
The Concept of "Discrimination" 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids an employer or a 
union to "discriminate" in employment because of an "individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The legislative history 
made clear that Congress was out to eliminate the classic form of 
discrimination-intentional, malicious, malign disparate treatment 
excluding minorities and women from desirable positions and equal 
benefits in the work force. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ( 1971) ,  a 
unanimous Court spoke through Chief Justice Burger and added a 
whole new dimension to the concept of discrimination. An employer 
had excluded a substantially larger percentage of blacks than whites 
from certain jobs because the blacks lacked high school diplomas and 
scored lower on standardized tests. The Court held that, regardless of 
the employer's intent, the use of a job qualification would violate Title 
VII if it had a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group 
and could not be shown to be a business necessity in its relation to 
performance of the job in question. 
Later, in the Manhart case ( 1978) ,  the Court stressed that Title VII 
focused on "fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." The 
Court went on to hold that female employees could not be required to 
pay more than male employees to help fund a retirement annuity 
providing equal benefits for males and females, even though women 
on the average live longer than men and it thus costs more to provide 
benefits for them. Many individual women, the Court pointed out, will 
not live as long as the average man. But this emphasis on the individual 
as a critical element in defining discrimination, helpful as it was in 
resolving the Manhart issue, would reveal some distinct deficiencies in 
other contexts, as the Court soon discovered. 
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Affirmative Action 
The most sensitive and difficult problem in employment discrimi­
nation is that of affirmative action, or conscious race and gender 
preferences in hiring, promotions, layoffs, and other job determina­
tions. The theory, of course, is compensation for past discrimination. 
The rub is that the individual beneficiary is often not an identifiable 
victim of that past discrimination, and the individual displaced is often 
innocent of any participation in the discrimination as well. 
Nonetheless, in the Weber case (1979) , a 5-to-2 majority of the Court 
sustained under Title Vll a private, voluntary on-the-job training 
program that reserved 50 percent of the openings for blacks until the 
percentage of black craftspersons in a plant approximated the 
percentage of black workers in the local area. The Court observed that 
the plan was adopted to eliminate persistent patterns of racially 
segregated jobs. Accordingly, the plan was in keeping with the very 
purpose of Title Vll, and it would be "ironic" if it were outlawed by 
"a law triggered by a nation's concern over centuries of racial 
injustice." 
While Justice Brennan emphasized on behalf of the Weber 
majority that the evident purpose of Title Vll was to improve the lot 
of those formerly excluded from the mainstream of American 
employment, he said nothing about the abundance of legislative 
history indicating that the means chosen by Congress to achieve this 
objective was "color blindness." Similarly, there was no reference to 
Manhart's insistence that Title Vll protects individual rights rather 
than group rights. White complainant Brian Weber, who had greater 
seniority than some of the black employees selected for the training 
program, could fairly claim that he as an individual was being 
deprived of a place because of his race. The Court was not above 
manipulating concepts of group versus individual justice to reach 
desired results. Finally, and most significantly, there was no attempt 
by the Weber majority to come to grips with the crucial statutory term, 
"discriminate." 
This is not to say that Weber was wrongly decided. It is to suggest 
that the majority could not agree upon a coherent, convincing 
rationale of the sort that united the Warren Court in Brown v. Board 
( 1954) ,  the landmark school desegregation decision. I sympathize with 
Justice Brennan's tactical problems in fashioning his fragile majority in 
Weber. I still believe, however, that more could have been done to 
bolster the intellectual appeal of the opinion. For example, the 
284 IRRA 44TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 
meaning of "discriminate" has evolved, so that it now connotes, not 
simple line drawing, but malign line drawing to someone's detriment 
or disadvantage. More important as a practical matter, the 15 years of 
exerience following the passage of Title VII in 1964 had demonstrated 
the naivete of some of its assumptions. "Color blindness" was not 
going to produce equality or even equal opportunity for groups long 
subject to deprivation and degradation. The socioeconomic reality of 
the position of minorities in our society, and in certain key respects of 
women as well, cried out for more positive steps. Finally, the Weber 
majority did not even mention that the U.S.  Senate, in adopting the 
comprehensive revision of Title VII contained in the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, twice rejected by 2-1 margins 
proposed amendments that would have express ly forbidden 
affirmative action by both government and private parties. 
The departure of Justices Brennan and Marshall leaves the future 
of affirmative action in considerable doubt. The Supreme Court's last 
major endorsement of preferential treatment, this time on the basis of 
sex, was I ohnson v. Santa Clara (1987) ,  decided 6-to-3 under Title VII. 
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and White dissented, with all three calling 
for the overruling of Weber. In the Croson case (1989) ,  which struck 
down an extreme form of city-mandated affirmative action as a 
violation of equal protection under the Constitution, Justice Kennedy 
joined the majority in applying the "strict scrutiny" test on the grounds 
that race is a suspect classification even if used for a "benign" purpose. 
Newly appointed Justice Thomas has been an announced foe of 
affirmative action in the past. It is therefore possible that five votes are 
now available to overrule Weber, regardless of how Justice Souter 
might go. But precedents as significant as Weber are not lightly 
overturned, and the Court has generally seemed more tolerant of 
private affirmative action, subject only to Title VII, as distinguished 
from public plans, subject also to the Constitution. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court's labor philosophy is a crazy quilt. It often 
downplays cherished worker values, like collective action, and modes 
of expression, like picketing. At the same time it embraces other union 
priorities, such as work preservation and dispute settlement through 
binding arbitration. Similarly, the Court has wavered irresolutely in 
sorting out the various worthy but competing interests at stake in 
affirmative action programs. To an extent this ambivalence may 
simply reflect the pragmatic approach of most American problem 
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solving. There may also be a healthy attentiveness to factual 
differences in particular situations. In certain areas, however, with 
affirmative action the paramount example, one can only conclude 
sadly that there has been a dearth of moral leadership. At its best, as in 
Brown v. Board, the Supreme Court serves as the conscience of the 
nation, and we are the less when it shirks that function. 
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